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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 05/03/2011 Accident number: 644 
Accident time: 08:20 Accident Date: 11/07/2010 
Where it occurred:  Country: Jordan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: Not recorded 
ID original source: None Name of source: Demining group 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: M14 AP blast Ground condition: dry/dusty 
hard 
rocks/stones 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 05/03/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east: 36. 15353 E Map north: 32. 52307 N 
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
non injurious accident (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
use of rake (?) 
standing to excavate (?) 
long handtool may have reduced injury (?) 
 
Accident report 
An internal demining group accident report was made available. The conversion into a DDAS 
file has led to some of the original formatting being lost.  Text in square brackets [ ] is 
editorial. 
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The internal report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
Incident investigation [Demining group] – MINE ACTION TEAM - JORDAN 
GRID REF: 32. 52307 N: 36. 15353 E 
MINEFIELD NO – 365, minefield TASK ID- swailmeh 3 
Investigation conducted by – [Demining group], [Name removed] 
Deminer:  [The Victim]: NIC NO: [Removed] 
TEAM LEADER: [Name removed], Team: Uniform 
TIME OF INCIDENT: 08:20 hrs. DATE OF INCIDENT: 11 July 2010 
NATURE OF INJURY: Nil 
TYPE OF MINE: M14 AP MINE 
 
IMSMA DETAILED REPORT FOR MINE INCIDENT, Sunday, 11 July 2010 
Part 1 – Description of the incident 
1. Organisation name: [Demining group], JORDAN. Team No: Uniform  
2. Incident date: 11 July 2010. Time: 08:20 hrs  
3. Location of incident: NE  SECTOR, Province: Mafraq, Village: Swailmeh, Project or task 
No: Swailmeh 3 (365) 
4. Name of site manager or team leader: [Name removed] 
5. Type of incident: uncontrolled detonation of a mine.  
6. Device was detonated by: Deminer  
7. Device detonated while: Raking  
8. Device was found in an area classified as:  a known Hazardous Area 
9. Narrative (Describe how the incident happened.  Attach additional pages and photographs 
or diagrams to assist in clarifying the circumstances surrounding the incident):  
The Deminer located the signal on one cluster in SML10 and he followed the procedure by 
approaching the signal from right side, and left side and accidentally he hit the M14 mine by 
the heavy rake from the top which caused the blast.  
Part 2 – Injuries 
10. Did the incident result in any injuries? No   
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 [The report included a photograph of a small scratch on the Victim’s arm (he appears to have 
been working with his sleeves rolled up).] 
11. List people injured and nature of injury: [None] 
Part 3 – Equipment damages 
12. Did the incident result in any damage to equipment or property? Yes  
13. List any mine action equipment or property damage: 
Heavy Rake, Damaged (not reusable)   
14. List damage to equipment or property owned by a member of the public or the 
government.  Include contact details of the owner or responsible person.  Heavy Rake, 
Damaged (not reusable)   
Part 4 – Explosive hazard  
15. Provide details of mines/UXO/ other devices that were involved in the incident. 
Device Type:      Method:       Determined by: 
AP (Blast) Mine     Buried     Raking 
16. State specific device (if known): Anti-Personal Mine M14 
17. Comments (include measurements of any crater resulting from the explosion): Crater 
Depth: approx. 20 cm / Width: approx. 40 cm  
Part 5 - Site conditions 
18. Describe the conditions at the site at time of the incident 
Ground/Terrain: Medium hard, Flat 
Weather: Clear, Mild 
Vegetation: Burnt, none 
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 [The accident site.] 
Part 6 – Team and task details 
20. Qualifications of Member(s) involved in the incident: 
[The Victim], Deminer 
21. How long had this team been?    
a. At this site? 45 days  
b. working on this task? 45 days  
c. working on the day? 1  Hours & 50 minutes 
22. Detector type: F3. Serial Number: 75 N17 407. Detector status: Functional. Passed to , 
[Name removed] for technical inspection at  Swailmeh 3 Site on  11 of July 201. Tripwire 
feeler used?  No. 
23. Hand tool: HEAVY RAKE 
24. PPE:  Vest, Visor, [Blast boots]  
25. Comments: [None] 
Part 7 - Medical & First Aid 
Medical treatment required? no   
26. Medical Support at Incident Site: Medic, 1st Aid Kit, Stretcher, Ambulance, Radio to call 
forward medic. 
27. Was a Mine Incident Drill carried out?  Yes  
28. Time and distance data 
a. Time from incident to SECTION MEDICAL POINT: ( 1 ) minutes  
b. Time spent at site administering treatment: N/A)  
c. Time from evacuation FROM to arrival King Abdullah Hospital: N/A  
Part 8 – Reporting procedures 
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Reported by: , [Name removed], [Demining group] Jaber Office to: [Demining group] Offices & 
NCDR  
Investigation conducted by: [Name removed] 
Report compiled/translated by: [Name removed], [Name removed] 
Verified by: [Name removed] 
 
FINDINGS 
Marking system was not applied on the ground during approaching to the mine. Triangle 
marker drill was not applied on the ground during excavation. Guessing and scratching were 
noted on the ground around the incident area. Approaching to the mine was done from both 
sides, left and right 
Signed: Tech. & Ver. Coord      
 
Operation Manager Recommendation  
The incident happened due an individual mistake while the deminer investigating an indicated 
signal by the metal detector in the predicted site of the AP mine within the cluster. 
The deminer mis approach the mine and hit it from the top which caused the heavy RAKE to 
press the pressure plate and activated the mine about 2m from the deminer (the length of the 
RAKE handle). This the second incident with the same deminer and the same scenario. 
The photos and investigating the incident site shows that the deminer make some changes to 
the incident site (which is against the [Demining group]/NBP SOP) and a lack of supervision 
and control from the team leader. 
Signed: Operations Manager 
   
Attachments: 
Statements by Injured Members  
Statements by Witnesses  
Photographs of Incident Site  
Copy of Incident Report 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 827 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: N/A Time to hospital: N/A 
Protection issued: blast boots 
Frontal apron 
Mask Visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Mask 
visor, blast boots 
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Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Arm 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Statements 
Statement 1: the Victim 
That was my first day on this area as I finished my previous site on Thursday and then I was 
sent to this new area to finish what the deminer [Name removed] started. 
While am using the detector I heard a signal, checked it according to the SOPs using the light 
and heavy rakes, while am using the heavy rake the explosion happened, nothing happened 
to me and I walked out of the field.  
Q, A:  
Q: Did you make the right procedures in detecting and progressing to the signal? 
A: Yes, I did. (Note: the deminer explained exactly what he did following the SOPs) 
Q: Was the detector working well before the accident? 
A: Yes, it was. 
Q: what was the depth of the exploded mine as a suggestion?  
A: around 16cm. 
Q: were the mines near superficial or deep? 
A: they were on 5-7cm. 
Q: Were you having any problems that day? 
A: No, and I asked them not to take me to the hospital. 
Note: , [Name removed] checked the detector and he said nothing wrong with it. 
 
Statement 2: Team Leader 
I was checking on the deminer, [Name removed] then went to, [Name removed] site when I 
heard a sound of AP mine explosion, I knew it was from the site of the de-miner [the Victim]. I 
informed the sector coordinator and medic about it and saw the deminer getting out of the 
field walking.  
Q, A: 
Q:  Did you check on the injured site that day? 
A:  Yes, I did. 
Q:  Did you notice anything wrong with the injured that day? 
A:  No. 
Q:  What was his productivity when the accident happened? 
A: around 12 m². 
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Q: Did you give your team the safety brief before they started working? 
A: Yes. 
Note: the nearest deminer to the accident was , [Name removed] but he was busy and didn’t 
notice what happened exactly. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators found that there was a “lack of supervision and control from the Team Leader” 
that including altering evidence at the accident site. The secondary cause is listed as 
Unavoidable because it seems likely that the Victim was working as directed when the 
accidental initiation occurred. 
The demining group who made this report available is thanked for its transparency and its 
professional concern to share lessons that can be learned from accidents. This record, along 
with several other records where rakes were used, provide compelling evidence that the 
controlled use of rakes can be both effective and tolerably safe (reducing risk of severe injury 
to tolerable levels). 
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